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For twenty-four years, an incorrect circuit court decision has 
effectively eliminated a federal remedy for state employees suffering 
from age discrimination in employment.
1 In 1989, the Fourth Circuit 
in Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department concluded that the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is the exclusive remedy 
for age-based employment discrimination.
2
 Specifically, the court held 
that the ADEA precludes
3
 § 1983 claims based on violations of the 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, Labor and Employment Law Certificate candidate, May 2013, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Michigan State 
University, B.A., Political Science/Pre-Law, August 2009. To my Mother, Father, 
and Samantha: Thank you for your support. 
1 See Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 2d 
945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002). 
2 868 F.2d 1364, 1369 (4th Cir. 1989). 
3 Preemption refers to situations where federal law displaces state law. See 
generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Misinterpreting “Sounds of Silence”: Why 
Courts Should Not “Imply” Congressional Preclusion of § 1983 Constitutional 
Claims, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 806 (2008). “Preclusion” will be used in this 
Comment to describe situations where a federal statute forecloses a remedy under 
another federal statute or the Constitution.  
1
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4
 Until 2012, 





 was created “to interpose the federal courts 
between the States and the people . . . to protect the people from 
unconstitutional action under color of state law.”
7
 The statute does not 
contain any substantive rights; it provides individuals with a federal 
cause of action to remedy violations of other federal laws or the 
Constitution.
8
 Congress has the authority to replace § 1983, or any 
other statute, with an alternative remedy.
9
 However, the courts 




In Smith v. Robinson and in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n (Sea Clammers), the Supreme Court 
established two tests to determine whether or not Congress intended to 
preclude § 1983 claims.
11
 The Sea Clammers doctrine evaluates 
whether Congress, by enacting a federal statute, intended to preclude 
                                                 
4 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370. 
5 Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2009); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other 
grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by 
Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d 1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000); Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t 
of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 760 (5th Cir. 1997); Rodrock v. Moury, No. 09–2383, 379 
F. App’x 164, 165 (3d Cir. May 11, 2010). 
6 Section 1983 states that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2006). 
7 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
8 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979).  
9 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
10 Id.  
11
Id.; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 
U.S. 1 (1981). 
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§ 1983 claims based on statutory violations.
12
 Alternatively, the test 




The question before the Fourth Circuit in Zombro was: Does the 
ADEA preclude § 1983 claims based on violations of the Equal 
Protection Clause?
14
 The Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied the Sea 
Clammers preclusion analysis reserved for statute-based § 1983 
claims.
15
 Inexplicably, most circuit courts have relied on the reasoning 
of the Fourth Circuit and engaged in little independent analysis.
16
  
In 2012, a Seventh Circuit panel comprised of Judges Kanne, 
Posner, and Bauer stepped out of the shadow of Zombro and its 
progeny.
17
 In Levin v. Madigan, Judge Kanne, writing for a unanimous 
court, held that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal protection 
claims.
18
 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit in Levin applied an improper 
analysis. Nevertheless, the decision is significant given its divergence 
from the weight of authority
19
 and its unique analysis: It is the only 
                                                 
12 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 1. 
13 Smith, 468 U.S. 992. 
14 Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989). 
15
 Id. at 1367. 
16 See Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 
2009) (the court found the Zombro reasoning “particularly persuasive”); Migneault 
v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Migneault, 528 U.S. 1110 (2000) (the court relied on 
Zombro and stated it was unnecessary to repeat the court’s reasoning); Lafleur v. 
Tex. Dep't of Health, 126 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1997) (the court relied on the weight of 
authority, including Zombro, holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination in employment). 
17 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012). 
18 Id. at 622.  
19 See Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1370 (the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal protection 
claims); Tapia-Tapia v. Potter, 322 F.3d 742, 745 (1st Cir. 2003) (ADEA is the 
exclusive remedy for age discrimination); Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1057 (the ADEA 
precludes § 1983 equal protection claims); Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1140 (refused to 
recognize equal protection claims to remedy age discrimination in employment); 
Lafleur, 126 F.3d at 760 (Section 1983 claim of age discrimination was preempted 
by ADEA where facts alleged did not support a § 1983 claim); Chennareddy v. 
Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination); Britt v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 978 F.2d 1441, 1449 (5th Cir. 
3
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circuit to compare the rights and protections of the ADEA to the rights 
and protections of a § 1983 equal protection claim. The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision undoubtedly changes the legal landscape, and more 
importantly, it gives state employees a federal forum to vindicate age 
discrimination in employment. 
This Comment argues that the ADEA is not the exclusive remedy 
for age discrimination in employment. Part I will provide a description 
of the relevant statutes: the ADEA and § 1983. This Section will also 
discuss how the Equal Protection Clause is implicated in age-based 
employment discrimination. Part II will outline the underlying legal 
precedent. Specifically, it will discuss how the Supreme Court has 
limited the availability of § 1983 relief. Part III will present the circuit 
split; it will illustrate how the circuit courts have overwhelmingly 
applied an improper preclusion analysis concerning the ADEA’s 
preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims. This Section will also 
discuss the implications and significance of the Seventh Circuit’s 
Levin decision. Based on Supreme Court precedent, Part IV will 
propose the proper standard for courts to utilize when determining 
whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 claims predicated on 
constitutional rights. Finally, Part V will apply this Comment’s 
proposed standard to the ADEA and § 1983. By expanding on the 
Seventh Circuit’s comparative evaluation, this Comment concludes 
that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal protection claims.  
 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE STATUTES 
 
In order to examine whether or not the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) precludes § 1983 equal protection claims, it 
is necessary to understand the underlying statutes. This Section 
examines § 1983 and the ADEA; it also describes how § 1983 equal 
protection claims arise in the context of age-based employment 
discrimination. 
 
                                                                                                                   
1992) (“Congress intended the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination claims”). 
4
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The ADEA was enacted to “promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment; and to help employers and workers 
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on 
employment.”
20
 Substantively, the Act provides that it is unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate against an employee because of his or her 
age.
21
 The ADEA is applicable against private employers, the federal 
government, employment agencies, and labor unions.
22
 In 1974, 
Congress amended the ADEA and extended application of the ADEA’s 
substantive requirements to the States.
23
 However, in Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court found that Congress did not 
validly abrogate the States sovereign immunity.
24
 As such, the States 




The ADEA only protects employees forty years of age and older.
26
 
It also limits or exempts protection for elected officials, specific 
members of their staff, firefighters, and law enforcement officers.
27
 
                                                 
20 Levin, 692 F.3d at 615 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)). 
21 29 U.S.C.A § 623(a)(1) (2006) (an employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s age”). 
22 29 U.S.C.A. § 630 (2006). 
23 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 68 (2000). 
24 Id. at 91. The Eleventh Amendment establishes the principle of sovereign 
immunity; the Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
25 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73.  
26 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a). 
27 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 623(j), 630(f)). 
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Furthermore, State employees have limited rights under the ADEA 




2. Administrative Requirements 
  
Under the ADEA, an employee subjected to age discrimination 
must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).
29
 Generally, the charge must be filed within 180 
days of the misconduct.
30
 A charge must be filed with the EEOC if the 
individual wants to file a civil suit.
31
 Once a charge is filed, the EEOC 
performs an investigation to determine if the employer engaged in 
prohibited conduct.
32
 If the EEOC concludes that a violation of the 
ADEA occurred, it will attempt “informal methods of conciliation, 
conference, and persuasion” to eliminate the discrimination.
33
 An 
employee can file a civil suit in federal court sixty days after filing a 
charge with the EEOC;
34
 an employee loses the right to file suit if the 






The ADEA incorporates the remedial provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA).
36
 Specifically, the ADEA authorizes backpay, 
reinstatement, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and liquidated 
damages.
37
 Courts also have the authority to award “equitable relief as 
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes” of the Act.
38
  
                                                 
28 Id. (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92). 
29 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at § 626(c)(2)(d)(1). 
32 Id. at § 626(a). 
33 Id. at § 626(b). 
34 Id. at § 626(c)(2)(d)(1)(a). 
35 Id. at § 626(c)(1). 
36 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995). 
37 Id.  
38 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b). Liquidated damages are also available but only when a 
violation of the ADEA was “willful.” Id. 
6
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B. Section 1983 
 
Section 1983 was created as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
39
 
Congress’ objective was to provide individuals with an avenue to the 
unbiased federal forum against state actors acting unconstitutionally.
40
 
Today, § 1983 provides state and local employees with a federal cause 
of action for violations of the Constitution and federally created 
rights.
41
 The statute does not contain any substantive rights;
42
 it 
operates as an enforcement mechanism by providing a cause of action 
against any “person” acting under color of state law.
 43
 A § 1983 claim 
may be brought against state and local government officials, as well as 
municipal and county governments.
44
 
A state actor that violates § 1983 “shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress.”
45
 The central purpose of a § 1983 damages award is to 





C. Utilizing § 1983 Equal Protection Claims for Age Discrimination in 
Employment 
 
The ADEA is not the only remedy available to employees who 
suffer from age-based employment discrimination. It is well settled 
                                                 
39 Lindsay Niehaus, The Title IX Problem: Is It Sufficiently Comprehensive to 
Preclude § 1983 Actions?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 499, 504 (2009). 
40 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
41 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
42 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). 
43 Id. “The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that 
the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state 
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of 
state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 
313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 
44 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
46 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-254 (1978). 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids arbitrary age discrimination.
47
 
State employees have brought justiciable equal protection claims 
against the States for age classifications affecting employment.
48
 A 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim based on age 
discrimination is subject to a “rational basis” level of scrutiny:
49
 a 
State may discriminate on the basis of age without violating the Equal 




Employees use § 1983 to enforce the constitutional right to be free 
from age discrimination.
51
 A state employee discriminated against 
because of age can file a charge with the EEOC based on ADEA 
violations.
52
 However, aside from a few exceptions, the States’ 
sovereign immunity prevents employees from enforcing violations of 
                                                 
47 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000)).  
48 See generally Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83; Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307 (1976) (involving equal protection challenge to state statute that 
required police officers to retire at age fifty); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 
(1991) (State court judges challenged mandatory retirement provision of State law as 
violating Equal Protection Clause). 
49 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84. 
50 Id. at 83. 
51 See e.g., Levin, 692 F.3d 607 (plaintiff asserted claims for relief under the 
ADEA under § 1983 Equal Protection Clause); Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher 
Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff asserted claim under § 1983 against 
supervisor for age discrimination in violation Equal Protection Clause); Migneault v. 
Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d 
1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff brought § 1983 equal protection claim to 
vindicate alleged age discrimination); Lafleur v. Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 
758 (5th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s § 1983 claim alleged “an equal protection violation to 
be free from age discrimination in employment”); Mustafa v. State of Nebraska 
Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 2d 945 (D. Neb. 2002) (employee brought 
§ 1983 equal protection claim against employer for alleged age discrimination); 
Shapiro v. New York City Dep’t. of Educ., 561 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(teacher asserted § 1983 equal protection claim to vindicate alleged age 
discrimination by the municipal board and principal). 
52 8-121 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 121.06. 
8
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the ADEA in a federal suit.
53
 For a state employee to achieve a remedy 
under the ADEA, the State must consent to be sued or the EEOC must 
bring a suit on behalf of the employee.
54
 Consequently, state 





II. LIMITING § 1983 CLAIMS: THE PRECLUSION STANDARDS 
 
It is important to recall that § 1983 can be used to vindicate both 
statutory and constitutional rights.
56
 Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has limited § 1983 relief by creating two distinct tests. The Sea 
Clammers test assesses whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 
claims based on violations of that same statute.
57
 The Smith test 
determines whether a federal statute precludes § 1983 claims 
predicated on constitutional violations.
58
 This Section outlines the 
Supreme Court’s preclusion decisions and summarizes the 
applicability of the preclusion tests.  
 
A. Precluding § 1983 Claims Predicated on Statutory Violations 
 
Congress asserts that a federal statute “will not give rise to 
liability under § 1983” when it provides a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme in the statute.
59
 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
National Sea Clammers Association (Sea Clammers), the plaintiff 
asserted § 1983 claims based on violations of two federal statutes.
60
 
                                                 
53 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. 
54 8-121 Larson on Employment Discrimination § 121.06. 
55 See Note 51. 
56 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
57 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981). 
58 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
59 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994) (citing Sea Clammers, 453 
U.S. at 20). 
60 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 4. 
9
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The Court noted that the statutes contained “unusually elaborate” 
enforcement provisions.
61
 For instance, both statutes required 
violations to be enforced by a government agency.
62
 The Court 
declared that when Congress includes a comprehensive enforcement 
scheme in a federal statute, “the requirements of that enforcement 
procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under 
§ 1983.”
63
 Because of the elaborate enforcement provisions, the Court 
concluded that the statutes precluded the § 1983 claims.
64
 
The Sea Clammer’s decision specifies that courts can infer 
Congress’ intent to preclude a statute-based § 1983 claim when the 
remedial scheme provided in that statute is “sufficiently 
comprehensive.”
65
 In later decisions, the Court announced that 
Congress’ intent could also be inferred from the context and legislative 
history of the statute.
66
 The Sea Clammers doctrine applies only to 
situations where a plaintiff seeks statutory relief under § 1983.
67
 In the 
succeeding Supreme Court cases, the plaintiffs relied on § 1983 to 
enforce constitutional rights rather than statutory rights.  
 
B. Precluding § 1983 Claims Predicated on Violations of the 
Constitution  
  
In Smith v. Robinson, the plaintiff brought claims under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) and § 1983 for violations of 
                                                 
61 Id. at 13. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 20. 
64 Id. at 21. 
65 Id. at 20. 
66 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1006 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (the Court 
investigated the legislative history to discover Congress’ intent); City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(“context . . . will often lead a court to Congress' intent in respect to a particular 
statute”). 
67 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004-1005. 
10
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
68
 Before 
the Court engaged in a preclusion analysis, it distinguished itself from 
Sea Clammers: the Court noted that the plaintiff in Sea Clammers 
attempted to “enlarge a statutory remedy by asserting a claim based on 
that statute under . . . § 1983.”
69
 Conversely, the plaintiff in Smith 




To determine if the EHA precludes § 1983 equal protection 
claims, the Court applied a two-step test.
71
 First, the Court ascertained 
whether the § 1983 claim was “virtually identical” to the EHA claim.
72
 
The Court relied on the court of appeal’s conclusion that the 
constitutional claim was equivalent to the statutory claim.
73
 To the 
Court, this indicated that the EHA was set up by Congress “to aid the 
States in complying with their constitutional obligations.”
74
 By 
creating federal rights virtually identical to constitutional rights, the 
statute incorporated the protections of the Constitution.  
Next, the Court examined the EHA for additional congressional 
intent to preclude § 1983 equal protection claims. At this stage, the 
Court applied what was likely a Sea Clammers analysis. The Court 
focused on the EHA’s comprehensive remedial scheme and concluded 
that it would be improper to allow plaintiffs to bypass such 
enforcement procedures.
75
 It was apparent to the Court that the EHA, 
not § 1983, was “the most effective vehicle for protecting the 
constitutional right.”
76
 According to Smith, the Sea Clammers doctrine 
is not determinative of preclusion unless the statutory claim and the 
§ 1983 constitutional claim are virtually identical.
77
 
                                                 
68 Id. at 994-996. 
69 Id. at 1004. 
70 Id. at 1004-1005. 
71 See generally Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude 
Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1998). 
72 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. (emphasis added). 
75 Id. at 1011-1012. 
76 Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). 
77
 Id. at 1009. 
11
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More recently, in Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, the 
Supreme Court was faced with the following question: Does Title IX 
of the Education Amendments of 1972 preclude § 1983 claims 
predicated on Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause?
78
 The Court 
applied both the Sea Clammers doctrine and Smith’s two-step analysis 
to determine preclusion: the Court was dealing with a § 1983 
constitutional claim and a § 1983 statutory claim.
79
 
First, the Court discussed the importance of congressional intent 
as outlined in Sea Clammers.
80
 Specifically, the Court noted that Title 
IX did not contain a comprehensive remedial scheme similar to the 
statutes in Sea Clammers.
81
 Without a comprehensive remedial 
scheme, a plaintiff could not bypass Title IX by bringing a § 1983 
claim based on violations of Title IX.
82




To address whether Title IX precludes § 1983 equal protection 
claims, the Court engaged in a comparison of the substantive “rights 
and protections.”
84
 The Court determined that the rights and 
protections offered under Title IX diverged from the rights and 
protections under § 1983 equal protection claims in the following 
ways: the claims apply to different actors; the standards of liability are 
different; and Title IX exempts conduct that could violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.
85
 The divergent rights lent “further support” to the 
Court’s conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to be the 
“sole means of vindicating the constitutional right.”
86
 The Court 
concluded that neither § 1983 claim was precluded and held that the 




                                                 
78 555 U.S. 246, 250 (2009). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 252. 
81 Id. at 255. 
82 Id. at 255-256.  
83 Id. at 256. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 256-258. 
86 Id. at 256.  
87 Id. at 258-259. 
12
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III. DOES THE ADEA PRECLUDE § 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS? 
THE CIRCUIT COURTS WEIGH IN 
 
Courts should not lightly infer that Congress intended to preclude 
§ 1983 as a remedy for Equal Protection Clause violations.
88
 Keeping 
in mind this presumption against implied preclusion, it is difficult to 
believe that every circuit court–excluding the Seventh Circuit–to 
consider the issue, has found that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy 
for age discrimination in employment.
89
 The Zombro v. Baltimore City 
Police Department decision has been dubbed the most important 
circuit court decision concerning the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983.
90
 
Since it was decided, many circuits have merely trusted the court’s 
reasoning and failed to engage in an independent analysis.
91
 This 
Section outlines and evaluates three circuit court decisions to address 
the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983; it also discusses the implications of 
the Seventh Circuit’s Levin v. Madigan decision. 
 
A. The Weight of Authority 
  
1. Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department 
 
In Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Department, a city police 
officer alleged that the police commissioner and the department 
engaged in age-based employment discrimination.
92
 The officer 
brought claims under § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause.
93
 To ascertain whether or not the ADEA precluded the 
                                                 
88 Id. at 250. 
89 See Note 18. 
90 David C. Miller, Note, Alone in Its Field: Judicial Trend to Hold That the 
ADEA Preempts § 1983 in Age Discrimination in Employment Claims, 29 STETSON 
L. REV. 573, 575 (2000). 
91 See Note 15. 
92 Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 868 F.2d 1364, 1365 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
93Id. The officer failed to timely file a complaint with the EEOC, The officer 
did not file a charge with the ADEA. Colleen Gale Treml, Zombro v. Baltimore City 
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officer’s § 1983 claim, the Fourth Circuit used the Sea Clammers 
doctrine and focused on the ADEA’s comprehensive enforcement 
scheme.
94
 As previously explained, the ADEA specifies that a charge 
of age discrimination must be filed with the EEOC;
 
the agency will 
then investigate the charge and attempt to mediate the dispute.
95
 The 
court opined that the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme would 
preclude § 1983 equal protection claims unless Congress manifestly 
intended to permit other remedies.
96
  
The Zombro court discovered Congress’ intent in the ADEA’s 
damages provision.
97
 The ADEA incorporates the damages clause of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
98
 To the Zombro court, the 
incorporation of the FLSA’s damages provision evinced Congress’ 
intent to foreclose actions under § 1983:
99
 The FLSA’s remedy “is the 
sole remedy available to [an] employee for enforcement of whatever 
rights he may have under the FLSA.”
100
 
Primarily, the Fourth Circuit was concerned that permitting 
§ 1983 equal protection claims would “debilitate” the enforcement 
mechanism provided in the ADEA.
101
 It feared that plaintiffs could 
bypass the EEOC procedures by asserting § 1983 claims “merely 
because they [were] employed by an agency operating under color of 
state law.”
102
 Consequently, the court held that the ADEA precludes 





                                                                                                                   
Police Department: Pushing Plaintiffs Down the ADEA Path in Age Discrimination 
Suits, 68 N.C. L. REV. 995, 996 (1990). 
94 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1367. 
95 See supra Part (I)(A)(2). 
96 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. 
97 Id.  
98 See supra Part (I)(A)(3). 
99 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1369. 
100 Id. at 1369 (citing Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F.Supp. 
1027 (N.D. Calif. 1972)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1369. 
103 Id. 
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2. Ahlmeyer v. Nevada System of Higher Education 
 
Following Zombro, the Ninth Circuit, in Ahlmeyer v. Nevada 
System of Higher Education, concluded that the ADEA precludes 
§ 1983 equal protection claims.
104
 In Ahlmeyer, the plaintiff alleged 
that her employer, a state actor, engaged in age-based employment 
discrimination.
105
 Unlike younger workers, the plaintiff was denied a 
request for an assistant.
106
 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
ADEA claim because the State was entitled to sovereign immunity.
107
 




The Ninth Circuit recognized that the plaintiff was asserting a 
constitutional claim under § 1983 and was not brining a § 1983 claim 
to enforce violations of the ADEA.
109
 Even so, the court stated that the 
Sea Clammers doctrine was the applicable preclusion standard:
110
 
§ 1983 claims are not available where Congress’ intent to preclude can 
be inferred from the passage of a comprehensive remedial scheme.
111
 
The court found the Zombro reasoning “particularly persuasive” and 
declared that it would not become the first circuit to contradict the 
Zombro holding.
112
 The court concluded that the ADEA’s 
comprehensive remedial scheme was enough to overcome the 
presumption against implied preclusion.
113
 
The court went on to rebut arguments put forth by district courts 
that have disagreed with the Zombro reasoning.
114
 One district court 
maintained that the Sea Clammers doctrine applies only to the 
                                                 
104 555 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009). 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1055. 
110 Id. at 1055-1056. 
111 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 
20, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981). 
112 Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056. 
113 Id. at 1057. 
114 Id. 
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preclusion of § 1983 claims predicated on statutory violations, not 
constitution-based § 1983 claims.
115
 The Ninth Circuit cited Smith as 
an example of the Supreme Court relying on a comprehensive 
remedial scheme to preclude a § 1983 constitutional claim.
116
  
Another district court argument was that state employees, without 
the availability of § 1983, would be left without a federal remedy for 
age discrimination in employment.
117
 The ADEA was amended to 
allow suits against the States but the Supreme Court declared that 
Congress did not validly abrogate the State’s sovereign immunity; 
therefore, individuals cannot bring ADEA suits against state actors.
118
 
The Ninth Circuit stated that courts must analyze the Act as it was 
written.
119
 Consequently, the court held that the ADEA precludes 
§ 1983 equal protection claims because it considered the amendment 





B. Creating the Split 
 
In 2012, the Seventh Circuit decided Levin v. Madigan.
121
 In 
Levin, a fifty-five year old employee was terminated and replaced by a 
worker in her thirties.
122
 The employee brought an ADEA claim and a 
§ 1983 equal protection claim against the State of Illinois, the Office 
of the Illinois Attorney General, and five supervisors in their 
individual or official capacities.
123
 Because the plaintiff was not an 
“employee” under the ADEA, his ADEA claim was dismissed.
124
 
                                                 
115 Id. at 1057-1058 (citing Mummelthie v. Mason City, Iowa, 873 F.Supp. 
1293 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).  
116 Id. at 1058. 
117 Id. at 1060 (citing Mustafa v. State of Neb. Dep't of Correctional Servs., 196 
F.Supp.2d 945 (D. Neb. 2002)). 
118 See supra Part (I)(A)(1). 
119 Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1060. 
120 Id. 
121 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012). 
122 Id. at 609. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 610. 
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However, the district court concluded that the § 1983 equal protection 
claim should proceed to trial.
125
 On appeal, the defendants asserted 




The Seventh Circuit started its analysis by outlining the Supreme 
Court decisions limiting § 1983 relief.
127
 For constitution-based 
§ 1983 claims, the court ascertained that congressional intent is 
essential.
128
 Furthermore, the court established that Congress’ intent 
can be inferred from the language of the statute, the legislative history, 
the statute's context, the comprehensiveness of the remedial scheme, 
and by a comparison of the rights and protections afforded by the 
statute and the § 1983 claim.
129
  
Firstly, the court noted the comprehensive remedial scheme of the 
ADEA–filing with the EEOC, the EEOC investigatory process, and 
conciliation and mediation efforts.
130
 However, the court declared that 
a comprehensive remedial scheme evinces Congress’ intent to 
preclude § 1983 claims predicated on statutory violations, not 
constitutional violations.
131
 Consequently, the ADEA’s comprehensive 
remedial scheme would not be enough to preclude § 1983 equal 




The Seventh Circuit disputed the Zombro court’s contention that 
Congress’ intent to preclude is implicit in the ADEA’s incorporation of 
the FLSA's remedial provisions.
133
 In Levin, the court stated that the 
FLSA’s remedial scheme evinced Congress’ intent to exclude § 1983 
claims to enforce FLSA rights.
134
 Unlike the ADEA, the FLSA lacks a 
                                                 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 611-615. 
128 Id. at 615. 
129 Id. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 617. 
132 Id. at 619. 
133 Id. at 620. 
134 Id.  
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 Therefore, the FLSA is irrelevant in 




Secondly, following Fitzgerald, the Seventh Circuit compared the 
“rights and protections” afforded by the ADEA to the rights and 
protections afforded under § 1983 equal protection claims.
137
 The 
court deduced that the rights applied to different defendants and 
different plaintiffs; it also noted that the two claims have different 
standards of proof.
138
 Aside from the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial 
scheme, the court was unable to discover additional congressional 
intent to preclude.
139
 Thus, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit 





C. Confusion in the Courts: What Happened to Step Number One?  
 
In Smith, discussed supra, the Court announced a preclusion 
analysis for constitution-based § 1983 claims.
141
 The Smith Court 
stipulated that the first step, when dealing with the preclusion of 
constitution-based § 1983 claims, is to determine if the statutory claim 
and the constitutional claim are “virtually identical.”
142
 The question 
presented before the courts in Zombro, Levin, and Ahlmeyer was: Does 
the ADEA preclude § 1983 claims based on violations of the Equal 
                                                 
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 621. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 619-622. 
140 Id. at 622. 
141 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
142 Id. at 1009. 
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 Each court misconstrued the reasoning in Smith 
and applied an improper preclusion analysis.  
Zombro, Ahlmeyer, and Levin referenced Smith;
144
 however, each 
Court interpreted the Smith reasoning differently. The Zombro court 
likely interpreted Smith as declaring that a comprehensive remedial 
scheme would preclude a constitution-based § 1983 claim unless there 
was manifest congressional intent indicating otherwise.
145
 To the 
Ahlmeyer court, Smith dictated that a statute’s comprehensive remedial 
scheme was conclusive of Congress’ intent to preclude a constitution-
based § 1983 claim.
146
 To the Seventh Circuit, Smith enumerated that a 
comprehensive remedial scheme would not preclude a constitution-
based § 1983 claim without additional congressional intent.
147
 
Although the Smith Court engaged in a comprehensive remedial 
scheme analysis, it first established that the rights of the § 1983 claim 
were virtually identical to the statutory claim.
148
 Neither the Zombro or 
Ahlmeyer court performed a “virtually identical” analysis. Instead, the 
courts applied the Sea Clammer’s comprehensive remedial scheme 
analysis designed for statute-based § 1983 claims.
149
  
                                                 
143 Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t., 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); Levin, 
692 F.3d 607. 
144 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368; Levin, 692 F.3d at 619; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 
1058. 
145 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1368-1369 (“[T]he general policy of precluding § 1983 
suits, where Congress has enacted a comprehensive statute specifically designed to 
redress grievances alleged by the plaintiff, is as applicable in . . . cases where a 
constitutional claim is attached to a statutory claim brought under § 1983. We hold 
that this policy should be followed unless the legislative history of the 
comprehensive statutory scheme in question manifests a congressional intent to 
allow an individual to pursue independently rights under both the comprehensive 
statutory scheme and other applicable state and federal statutes.”). 
146 Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1058. 
147 Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. 
148 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
149 Zombro, 868 F.2d at 1366; Ahlmeyer, 555 F.3d at 1056. 
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In Levin, the court concluded that a comprehensive remedial 
scheme was not enough to preclude constitution-based § 1983 
claims.
150
 Unlike the courts in Zombro and Ahlmeyer, the Seventh 
Circuit required additional evidence of Congress’ intent to preclude.
151
 
To find that additional evidence, the court followed the guidance of 
Fitzgerald: The court engaged in a preclusion analysis that integrated a 
comparison of the rights and protections of the ADEA to § 1983 equal 
protection claims.
152
 Because the rights and protections significantly 




The Seventh Circuit properly recognized that additional evidence 
of Congress’ intent to preclude is necessary for a comprehensive 
remedial scheme to preclude a § 1983 constitutional claim. However, 
the court looked to the comprehensiveness of the ADEA’s remedial 
scheme before it engaged in a comparison of rights and protections.
154
 
As stated above, Smith demonstrates that the first step when dealing 
with the preclusion of § 1983 constitutional claims is to determine if 
the statute and the § 1983 claim are virtually identical.
155
  
Even though the Seventh Circuit did not correctly apply the 
preclusion analysis, the court’s holding has major implications. For 
instance, the ruling gives state employees within the Seventh Circuit a 
federal forum for a state actor’s age-based employment discrimination. 
Moreover, state employees in other circuits now have a stronger 
foundation for bringing § 1983 equal protection claims.
156
 Most 
                                                 
150 Levin, 692 F.3d at 617-618. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 621. 
153 Id. at 621-622. 
154 Id. at 618. 
155 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). The 
Fitzgerald Court did not overturn the ruling in Smith and, consistent with Smith, the 
Court engaged in what was likely a “virtually identical” analysis. 
156 Cf. Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other 
grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), reaffirmed by 
Migneault v. Peck, 204 F.3d 1003, 1004 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff’s § 1983 
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important, circuits that have not addressed the ADEA’s preclusion of 
§ 1983 will certainly have to contend with the Levin analysis; no other 
circuit court has engaged in a comparative analysis or found the 
ADEA not to preclude § 1983 equal protection claims. The Levin 
decision will likely persuade other circuits to rule opposite of Zombro 
and its progeny. Supreme Court review of the issue seems inevitable. 
This Section examined three circuit court decisions dealing with 
the ADEA’s preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims. It 
demonstrated how three circuits interpreted Supreme Court preclusion 
precedent differently. Ahlmeyer’s reliance on Zombro exemplifies that 
courts do not understand which preclusion analysis to apply. Despite 
being decided after Fitzgerald, the Ninth Circuit failed to mention the 
Fitzgerald decision and did not engage in a comparative analysis, as 
directed by Fitzgerald and Smith. The next Section of this Comment 
proposes the proper standard for determining the preclusion of 
constitution-based § 1983 claim. 
 
IV. THE PROPER STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE PRECLUSION OF 
CONSTITUTION-BASED § 1983 CLAIMS: SYNERGIZING SMITH, 
FITZGERALD, AND SEA CLAMMERS 
 
In order to determine if the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal 
protection claims, courts must understand the proper preclusion 
analysis. The previous Section indicates that circuit courts do not 
comprehend Supreme Court preclusion precedent. The Supreme 
Court’s Smith decision was understood three different ways by three 
different courts and the Ninth Circuit altogether disregarded the 
Court’s preclusion analysis in Fitzgerald.
157
 This Comment proposes 
the following interpretation of Supreme Court precedent:  
 
                                                                                                                   
equal protection claim was dismissed because the plaintiff cited no authority 
contrary to Zombro). 
157
 See Zombro v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 868 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); Levin v. 
Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 
U.S. 246 (2009). 
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A. Step One: Smith and Fitzgerald: Are the Rights and Protections 
Offered Under the Statute Virtually Identical to the Rights and 
Protections Offered under the § 1983 Constitutional Claim? 
 
When ascertaining Congress’ intent to preclude, courts should 
bear in mind that statutory repeals by implication are disfavored.
158
 
With that said, Smith mandates that courts should first evaluate 
whether or not the statutory claim and the constitution-based § 1983 
claim are “virtually identical.”
159
 Although the Smith Court did not 
expand on its virtually identical analysis, in 2009 the Fitzgerald court 
engaged in what was likely a Smith evaluation by comparing “the 
rights and protections of the statute [to] those existing under the 
Constitution.”
160
 If the rights and protections are virtually identical, it 
indicates that Congress viewed the statute as the “most effective 
vehicle for protecting the constitutional right.”
161
 Consequently, the 
reviewing court should move to the second step of the analysis. 
However, if the “rights and protections diverge in significant ways,” a 
court should infer that Congress did not intend to preclude the 
constitution-based § 1983 claim;
162
 the analysis is over and the statute 
does not preclude the § 1983 claim. 
 
B. Step Two: Sea Clammers: If the Rights and Protections are Virtually 
Identical, is there Additional Congressional Intent to Preclude? 
 
A court should only move to the second step if the rights of the 
statute and the constitution-based claim are virtually identical.
163
 At 
                                                 
158 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976) (a cardinal 
principle of statutory construction is that “repeals by implication are not favored”). 
159 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1009. 
160 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009). 
161 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1013. 
162 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252-253. 
163 See generally Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude 
Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (1998) (“Under Smith . . . even 
if a plaintiff raises a Section 1983 claim predicated on a constitutional right that is 
identical to the right conferred by a statute, that statute will not preclude the Section 
1983 claim unless the court finds that Congress intended such preclusion.”). 
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this step, a court should apply the Sea Clammers doctrine to determine 
whether or not Congress intended the statute to be the exclusive 
remedial avenue. Congressional intent can be inferred from the 
statute’s context,
164
 the legislative history,
165
 or from the existence of a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme.
166
 If the statute contains a 
comprehensive remedial scheme, or there are other indicia of 
congressional intent to preclude, the statute subsumed the 
constitutional right and the § 1983 claim is precluded.  
 
C. Why this Proposal? 
 
1. Where rights and protections differ, a comprehensive remedial 
scheme will not be bypassed. 
   
Where the rights and protections offered by a statute differ from 
the rights and protections offered by a constitution-based § 1983 
claim, it is inappropriate to apply the Sea Clammers doctrine. In Sea 
Clammers, the Court held that when a statute contains a 
comprehensive remedial scheme, statute-based § 1983 claims allow 
plaintiffs to proceed to federal court based on violations of a statute 
that commands a different enforcement path.
167
 Statutes containing 
comprehensive remedial schemes would become frivolous if plaintiffs 
could bring violations of the statute directly to the unbiased federal 
forum by utilizing § 1983.
168
 
The circumvention concern also exists with constitution-based 
§ 1983 claims but only if the rights and protections are virtually 
identical to the statutory claim. If constitutional protections are 
virtually identical to statutory protections, a plaintiff filing a § 1983 
                                                 
164 City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
165 See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1006 (the Court investigated the legislative history to 
discover Congress’ intent). 
166 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 
20 (1981). 
167 Id. 
168 Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011. 
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constitutional claim is enforcing what are essentially statutory 
violations in federal court. Consequently, the plaintiff procures the 
benefits of federal court, bringing what is effectively a statutory claim, 
but is able to sidestep the remedial scheme of the statute. This is 
indistinguishable from a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim to enforce 
statutory violations where the statute has a comprehensive remedial 
scheme that mandates a different remedial path: in both instances, the 
plaintiff is bypassing a statute’s remedial avenue to enforce statutory 
rights or significantly similar rights in federal court. 
Notably, the circumvention concern is not present when the 
§ 1983 constitutional claim and the statutory claim have divergent 
rights and protections. When Congress includes a comprehensive 
remedial scheme in a statute, it anticipates that the scheme will be 
used to enforce rights protected by that statute; it does not anticipate 
that the scheme will be utilized to enforce distinct rights secured by 
another body of law. Simply put, a plaintiff is not bypassing a statute’s 
comprehensive remedial scheme by brining a § 1983 claim to 
vindicate distinct rights external to the statute.  
 
2. Another interpretation of Fitzgerald? 
 
This Comment interprets Fitzgerald as an expansion of the 
“virtually identical” analysis revealed in Smith. However, based on 
Fitzgerald, an argument could be made that the proper analysis begins 
with the existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme. In Fitzgerald, 
the Court applied the Sea Clammers doctrine before it compared rights 
and protections.
169
 The Court then stated that the lack of similarity 
between the constitution-based § 1983 claim and the statutory claim 
“len[t] further support” to the conclusion that the § 1983 claim could 
not be precluded.
170
 This could be construed as evidence that a 
comprehensive remedial scheme is the first step for determining the 
preclusion of any § 1983 claim.  
                                                 
169 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009). 
170 Id. at 256. 
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However, unlike the Courts in Smith and Sea Clammers, 
Fitzgerald dealt with the preclusion of a statute-based § 1983 claim 
and a constitution-based § 1983 claim.
171
 Because the Court addressed 
the § 1983 statutory claim first, it engaged in a Sea Clammer’s analysis 
first. Accordingly, the Fitzgerald Court’s initial discussion of Sea 
Clammer’s could be attributed to its formatting of the issues. At best, 
Fitzgerald is ambiguous and it is unclear which analysis applies first 
to the preclusion of constitution-based § 1983 claims.
172
 Since the 
Fitzgerald decision did not overrule the Smith test, it should be read as 
an expansion of the virtually identical analysis. 
 
V. THE ADEA DOES NOT PRECLUDE § 1983 EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAIMS FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT  
 
The question this Comment seeks to answer is: Does the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) preclude § 1983 claims to 
vindicate violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment? This Comment’s preclusion standard, discussed supra, 
applies to § 1983 claims based on constitutional rights. Accordingly, 
this Section utilizes this Comment’s preclusion analysis and evaluates 
whether the rights of the ADEA are virtually identical to the rights of 
§ 1983 equal protection claims. By expanding on the Seventh Circuit’s 
assessment in Levin v. Madigan, this Section concludes that the ADEA 
                                                 
171 Id. at 250. 
172 It is unclear which analysis would come first based on the language in 
Fitzgerald. In one section the Court states that “[a] comparison of the substantive 
rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX and under the Equal Protection 
Clause lends further support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX 
to preclude § 1983 constitutional suits.” Id. at 256 (emphasis added). This language 
might indicate that the comparative analysis would come second to the 
comprehensive remedial scheme analysis. The Fitzgerald Court also provided: “In 
light of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well 
as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in 
Sea Clammers . . . we conclude that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive 
mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools.” Id. at 258 (emphasis 
added). This language suggests that the comprehensive remedial scheme analysis is 
secondary to the comparative analysis. 
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is not the exclusive remedy for age discrimination in employment. To 
finish, this Section reveals why it is inappropriate to apply the Sea 
Clammer’s doctrine to the ADEA and § 1983. 
 
A. The Rights and Protections Under the ADEA are not “Virtually 
Identical” to the Rights and Protections of § 1983 Equal Protection 
Claims 
 
To determine if a federal statute precludes a constitution-based 
§ 1983 claim, the first step is to apply the “virtually identical” 
analysis.
173
 That analysis demands a comparison of the rights and 
protections of the statute to those available under the Constitution.
174
 
When the “contours of such rights and protections diverge in 
significant ways,” Congress did not intend to preclude the 
constitution-based § 1983 claims.
175
 In Levin, the Seventh Circuit 
engaged in an inclusive comparison of the rights offered under the 
ADEA to those existing under § 1983 equal protection claims.
176
 That 
assessment has tremendous value to the preclusion analysis and is 
expanded on here: 
First, there are several divergences concerning who can be sued 
under the ADEA and who can be sued under § 1983.
177
 The ADEA 
only restricts private employers, the federal government, unions, and 
employment agencies.
178
 Conversely, a § 1983 plaintiff may file suit 
against persons acting under color of state law.
179
 Persons acting under 
color of state law include individuals in their personal or official 
capacities.
180
 In certain situations, liability under § 1983 can also 
extend to municipal and county governmental entities.
181
 If the ADEA 
                                                 
173 See supra Part (IV)(A). 
174 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 252. 
175 Id. at 252-53. 
176 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 2012). 
177 Id. 
178 29 U.S.C.A. § 630 (2006). 
179 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (2006). 
180 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
181 Id. (“Local governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to 
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precludes § 1983 equal protection claims, the number of potential 
defendants shrinks substantially. For instance, employees would be 
unable to bring age-based discrimination claims against culpable 
individuals acting under color of state law.  
Second, the ADEA and § 1983 protect different types of 
employees.
182
 The ADEA excludes from its protection elected officials 
and limits protection for certain members of their staff, appointees, 
law enforcement officers, and firefighters.
183
 The ADEA also limits its 
protection to employees over the age of forty;
184
 it does not prevent 
employers from favoring older employees. The constitution does not 
have similar limitations.
185
 Significantly, without § 1983 equal 
protection claims, employees under the age of forty who are 
discriminated against because of age, will be left remediless for 
otherwise actionable employment discrimination.
186
  
Moreover, if the ADEA precludes § 1983 equal protection claims, 
state employees are left without a federal forum for age 
discrimination.
187
 Interestingly, this lack of federal remedy did not 
trouble the Ninth Circuit in Ahlmeyer.
188
 In Ahlmeyer, the court held 
that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 claims when it amended 
the ADEA to include state employers.
189
 However, according to the 
Supreme Court, what the ADEA amendment actually evinced was 
                                                                                                                   
be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.”). 
182 Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. 
183 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(j), 630(f)); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009) (Court found preclusion inappropriate where the 
statutory exemptions would have rights under § 1983 equal protection claim)). 
184 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a). 
185 Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. 
186 Stephanie Armour, Young Workers Say Their Age Holds Them Back, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 7, 2003, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace
/2003-10-07-reverseage_x.htm (“In this tepid economy, some workers in their 20s 
and 30s say their age is being unfairly held against them”). 
187 See e.g., Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 
2d 945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002); Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. 
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Congress’ intent to provide state employees with a federal remedy for 
age-based employment discrimination.
190
 Because the amendment was 
overturned, the ADEA is not applicable against the States by private 
federal suit.
191
 Accordingly, a court that precludes § 1983 equal 
protection claims is disregarding Congress’ intent to provide state 
employees with a federal remedy.
192
 Without the availability of § 1983 
equal protection claims, state employees suffering form age-based 




Third, the two claims have different standards of proof.
194
 An 
equal protection claim is subject only to rational basis review, meaning 
the age classification must be rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.
195
 A court will not find a State’s action unlawful unless the 
different treatment “is so unrelated to the achievement of any 
combination of legitimate purposes” that the only conclusion is the 
State’s conduct was irrational.
196
 Rational basis of review is so 
deferential that a court may even hypothesize a State’s legitimate 
interest if the State does not provide one.
197
 As such, an individual 
challenging the constitutionality of an age-based employment 
classification bears a heavy burden.
198 In contrast, an ADEA plaintiff 
                                                 
190 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 74 (2000) (“the plain 
language of [the ADEA’s] provisions clearly demonstrates Congress' intent to 
subject the States to suit . . . at the hands of individual employees” in federal court). 
191 Id. at 91. 
192 Mustafa, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 956. 
193 See e.g. Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Services, 196 F. Supp. 
2d 945, 955 (D. Neb. 2002); Levin, 692 F.3d at 621. 
194 Levin, 692 F.3d at 619. 
195 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83–84. 
196 Id. at 84. 
197 Shoshana Zimmerman, Note, Pushing the Boundaries?: Equal Protection, 
Rational Basis, and Rational Decision Making by District Courts in Cases 
Challenging Legislative Classifications on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 21 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 727, 735 (2012). 
198 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)) 
(“[B]ecause an age classification is presumptively rational, the individual 
challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving that the ‘facts on which 
28
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need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was a 
“but-for” cause of an employer’s decision.
199
 As the Seventh Circuit 
notes, the ADEA “prohibits substantially more state employment 
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional 
under the applicable equal protection, rational basis standard.”
200
  
In Ahlmeyer, the Ninth Circuit found the difference of proof 
problematic.
201
 Because the ADEA provides greater protection, 
plaintiffs have “nothing substantive to gain” by bringing a § 1983 
equal protection claim.
202
 The Ninth Circuit’s assumption is incorrect 
because without § 1983 equal protection claims, state employees 
suffering from age-based employment discrimination and employees 
suffering from reverse age discrimination are left without a federal 
remedy. Moreover, even if plaintiffs had nothing substantive to gain, 
that would not change the fact that the standards of proof are different. 
The important question is whether the claims are virtually identical
203
 
and the difference in proof is another example that they are not. 
Fourth, § 1983 commonly has a more generous limitations period 
than the ADEA.
204
 Under the ADEA, an individual must file a claim 
with the EEOC, usually within 180 days of the employer’s 
misconduct.
205
 By contrast, the limitations period for § 1983 equal 
protection claims is likely to be substantially longer because it is 
adopted from the State’s statute of limitations for personal injury 
                                                                                                                   
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by 
the governmental decisionmaker.’”). 
199 Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009). 
200 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 619 (7th Cir. 2012); accord Kimel, 528 
U.S. at 87 (“Measured against the rational basis standard . . . the ADEA plainly 
imposes substantially higher burdens”). 
201 Ahlmeyer v. Nevada Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
202 Id. 
203 See supra Part (IV)(A). 
204 Stephen Bergstein, Age Discrimination Can Violate Section 1983, 
(June 29, 2008, 1:47 PM), http://secondcircuitcivilrights.blogspot.com/2008/06/age-
discrimination-can-violate-section.html (Section 1983 equal protection claims have a 
“longer statute of limitations than the ADEA: three years to 300 days.”). 
205 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (2006). 
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 The longer statute of limitations should provide state 
employees with greater rights and protections against age 
discrimination in employment. However, if § 1983 equal protection 
claims are precluded, the statute of limitations is worthless; state 
employees will not even be able to file a federal suit.  
Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized substantial differences 
between the ADEA and Equal Protection Clause claims. In Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, supra, the Court held that the ADEA did not 
validly abrogate the States sovereign immunity and therefore, the 
ADEA is not applicable against the States.
207
 As part of its analysis, 
the Court compared the ADEA’s protections to Equal Protection 
Clause guarantees.
208
 The Court made two points that are crucial to 
this Comment’s analysis: (1) the ADEA “cannot be understood as 
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior,”
209
 




The Court’s language establishes that there is a constitutional right 
to be free from age-based employment discrimination
211
 and the 
ADEA does not fully enforce violations of that right. It is an 
“indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy . . . whenever that right is invaded.”
212
 If the ADEA precludes 
§ 1983 equal protection claims, state employees and employees 
suffering from reverse age discrimination will have the constitutional 
right to be free from age-based employment discrimination, but may 
have no remedy for its violation. That conclusion would be odd; 




                                                 
206 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). 
207 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). 
208 See Id. at 83-91. 
209 Id. at 82 (internal citation omitted). 
210 Id. at 88. 
211 See also Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
Kimel clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
212 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
213
 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
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It is apparent that the rights and protections offered by the ADEA 
are not “virtually identical” to the rights and protections offered by 
§ 1983 equal protection claims. Therefore, it is unnecessary to apply 
step two and search for additional evidence of Congress’ intent. 
According to this Comment’s proposed preclusion analysis, the 
different rights establish that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 
equal protection claims to vindicate age discrimination in 
employment.  
 
B. A Final Word of the Inappropriateness of the Sea Clammers 
Doctrine: The ADEA’s Comprehensive Remedial Scheme Will not be 
Bypassed by § 1983 Equal Protection Claims  
 
The Zombro court’s central argument was that the ADEA’s 
comprehensive remedial scheme would be debilitated if plaintiffs 
could file § 1983 equal protection claims.
214
 Specifically, the court was 
concerned that plaintiffs—in order to bring claims directly to the 
unbiased federal court—would assert § 1983 claims and circumvent 
the ADEA’s comprehensive remedial scheme.
215
 
Undoubtedly, the remedial scheme of the ADEA is 
comprehensive. The ADEA’s remedial scheme, including the filing 
and other procedural requirements with the EEOC,
216
 is on par with 
the scheme declared comprehensive in Smith.
217
 The scheme evinces 
Congress’ intent for the ADEA to be the sole means of vindicating 
violations of the ADEA; it does not establish that Congress intended 
the ADEA to be the sole means of enforcing violations of the Equal 
                                                 




 29 U.S.C.A. § 626. 
217
 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010-1011 (1984) superseded by statute, 
Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–372, 100 Stat. 796, 
as recognized in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Court found 
the Education of the Handicapped Act a comprehensive remedial scheme because it 
contained procedures that allowed for “each child's individual educational needs be 
worked out through a process that begins on the local level and includes . . . detailed 
procedural safeguards and a right to judicial review”). 
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 This is especially true given the different rights 
and protections offered by § 1983 equal protection claims. 
Hypothetically, if the claims were virtually identical, allowing a 
plaintiff to file a § 1983 equal protection claim would be 
indistinguishable from a plaintiff filing a § 1983 claim based on 
violations of the ADEA: the plaintiff filing the § 1983 equal protection 
claim is circumventing the remedial scheme of the ADEA in order to 
vindicate what are essentially ADEA violations.  
However, § 1983 equal protection claims reach different 
defendants, protect different employees, and have different standards 
of proof than ADEA claims.
219
 According to the proper reading of 
Smith, Fitzgerald, and Sea Clammers, no court could conclude that 
Congress perceived the ADEA to be the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination in employment: the protections guaranteed by the two 




Prior to the Seventh Circuit’s Levin v. Madigan decision, a string 
of circuit court cases rendered the ADEA the exclusive remedy for age 
discrimination in employment.
220
 These circuits left their state 
employees without a federal remedy for age-based employment 
discrimination and slowly created a weight of authority that no circuit 
would rule against. When the Ninth Circuit disregarded Supreme 
Court precedent in favor of Zombro and its progeny, the validity of the 
weight of authority needed to be questioned. The Seventh Circuit 
answered the call. Following Fitzgerald, the Seventh Circuit properly 
compared the rights and protections of the ADEA to § 1983 equal 
protection claims and concluded that the ADEA is not the exclusive 
remedy for age discrimination in employment.
221
 However, even the 
                                                 
218 Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Ia., 873 F. Supp. 1293, 1327 (N.D. 
Iowa 1995) aff'd sub nom. Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa, 78 F.3d 589 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
219 See supra Part (V)(A). 
220 See Note 18. 
221 Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607, 622 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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Seventh Circuit was slightly misguided in its application of Supreme 
Court precedent. Due to circuit court confusion, this Comment 
provides the proper standard for determining the preclusion of 
constitution-based § 1983 claims. Using this standard, this Comment 
expands on the Seventh Circuit’s comparative assessment and 
correctly concludes that the ADEA does not preclude § 1983 equal 
protection claims. In order to protect all employees from age 
discrimination, courts must come to the understanding that the ADEA 
and § 1983 equal protection claims are simply alternative methods of 
fighting age-based employment discrimination as each supplies 
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